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Material Alteration and Cognitive Activity 
in Aristotle's De Anima
by John Sisko, Temple University 
SAGP meeting at the Marriot Marquis, 
New York, December 28, 1995
§1. Over the past few decades Aristotelian scholars have directed significant energies toward the
study of the De Anima (DA). One prominent concern in the recent literature takes as its focus
Aristotle's treatment of our higher psychic capacities: the capacities by which we judge, namely
aisthesis and nous. The main concern has been his position on the relations between the cognitive
activities (of perceiving and thinking) and material alteration. The salient question is: does cognitive
functioning require the sorts of happenings which we would now describe as physiological changes?1
On this score, consensus has not been reached; neither in respect to perception nor in respect to
thought is there agreement on the role of material alteration. In fact, when it comes to perception, the
literature has shaken the foundations of a pre-existing state of consensus. Not long ago it had been
taken as nearly axiomatic that perceiving, on Aristotle's account, requires material alteration within the
organ of perception.2 But recently, one scholar, Myles Burnyeat, has argued that, while the account
in the DA shows that perception requires certain static material conditions (for example, a creature must
have eyes composed of transparent material in order to have the capacity to see), perceiving does not
involve material alteration.3 On this view, when I become perceptually aware of a visible quality, this
is not due (even in part) to a material happening of an ordinary type within my eyes and so there are
no sufficient physiological conditions for perceiving one quality rather than another (green rather than
yellow, etc.). In Burnyeat's own words,
the physical material of animal bodies in Aristotle's world is already pregnant with 
consciousness, needing only to be awakened... (Burnyeat 1992, p.19), 
there is no physiological process which stands to the awareness of a color or a sound as matter 
to form. (Burnyeat 1993, p.263).
As it stands, those now involved in the debate over the nature of perception fall into two camps: those
who think that perception does require material alteration and those who (along with Burnyeat) think
that it does not.4 When it comes to the account of thought, we are confronted with a less tidy
situation: (1 ) some suggest that Aristotle is a physicalist or a functionalist about thought, taking it to
be somehow realized in material alteration within the body, (2) others suggest that he is a dualist,
taking mind or at least the famous productive intellect of DA III.5 to be immaterial and not dependent
on the body in any way, and (3) yet others suggest that thought presupposes material alteration as an
antecedent causal condition, but that episodes of thought needn't depend on episodes of material
alteration.5 These are only a few of the approaches to the account of thought found in the recent
literature, but they sufficiently illustrate the variety among contemporary interpretations.
In this paper, I would like to sketch my own account of the relation between cognitive activity
and material alteration within Aristotle's psychological theory. I will begin by suggesting a new
framework through which to view the important issues (§2). I will then show that on Aristotle's
account material alteration is required both for any episode of perception in animals taken generally (§3)
and for any episode of thought in human beings (§4). Finally, I will examine Aristotle's rationale for
supposing that material alteration is required for human thought (§5).
2
§2. We moderns tend not to make a distinction between two different philosophically interesting 
questions. First, (1 ) is it necessary for a φ-ing thing to have a body (where Φ-ing is a type of cognitive 
functioning)? Second, (2) do episodes of Φ-ing necessarily involve bodily changes? We tend not to 
distinguish between these questions, because for the most part we think that an answer to the first 
implies a like answer to the second. If we think that one must have a body in order to perceive, then 
we suppose that the act of perceiving must involve bodily changes and if we suppose that one needn't 
have a body in order to think, then we also suppose that the act of thinking (even for creatures with 
bodies) needn't involve bodily changes.
Aristotle offers straightforward answers to our first question: it is necessary for a perceiving 
thing to have a body and it is not necessary for a thinking thing to have one. Perception serves a 
specific purpose; it allows for the avoidance of dangers in the environment (dangers like poisonous 
foods and hungry predators) and it allows for the acquisition of useful things (such as, palatable food 
and mates).(DA 111.12 434a32-b2 & b16-17) Thus, perception is of use only to beings which have 
nutritive or reproductive capacities. Mon-bodily beings would presumably have no need for such 
capacities. Thus, since nature does nothing in vain (434a32), it follows that each perceiving thing has 
a body.6
However, Aristotle believes that there is at least one thinking thing that exists without a body: 
the Prime Mover of Metaphysics Λ7&9. This Mover is a divine being which is eternally active in 
thought while existing outside of the material heavens; it is a wholly non-bodily thinking thing. The 
example of the Prime Mover shows that, on Aristotle's account, the essential nature of thought does 
not in itself imply the need for a body. Thus, being embodied is not a necessary feature of each 
thinking thing.
These straightforward answers to our first question should not be taken to imply like answers 
to our second. In the case of perception, (as I have already indicated) arguments have been advanced 
which suggest that material alteration is not a requirement for particular episodes. These arguments 
possess prima facie plausibility. So, we must look to the texts in order to determine where Aristotle 
stands in respect to our second question about perception. In the case of thought, the texts 
themselves foster a sense of confusion. Aristotle repeatedly claims that nous is separable.7 
Specifically, he gives every sign of thinking that it is separable from the body.8 This suggests that he 
is some sort of dualist. However, he also thinks that thought is not without imagination9 and, since 
it may be that imagination involves material alteration, this at least suggests that thought is somehow 
dependent upon material alteration. So, we must look attentively to the texts in order to determine 
where Aristotle stands in respect to our second question about thought. In trying to get clear on 
Aristotle's understanding of the relation between thought and material alteration we Should note that 
the outcome of our own investigation into perception will be of some use; for if perception has 
necessary material conditions but no distinctive or sufficient material conditions (more precisely, if it 
does not involve material alteration), this suggests that thought has neither necessary nor sufficient 
material conditions, since Aristotle claims that nous is less bodily than aisthesis. (DA III.4 429b5-6) 
Thus, if we are able to show that perceiving involves material alteration within the organ of perception,
3nous may turn out to be less bodily than perception by having necessary but not sufficient material 
conditions for its realization in human beings. This will block one avenue of justification for a dualist 
reading of nous.
§3. Let us begin by examining what is taken to be the most powerful argument in support of the 
position that perception does not involve material alteration. In DA 11.5 Aristotle offers his famous 
distinction between the transition from potentiality1 to actuality! and the transition from the latter 
(which is also called potentiality2) to actuality2. The distinction reduces to a threefold classification of 
states: (1 ) one can be active in the exercise of a settled disposition (as the wise man is when thinking 
wise thoughts); this is an actuality2, (2) one can have the settled disposition to be so active (as the 
wise man has when sleeping); this is an actuality!/potentiality2, (3) and one can have the potential to 
develop a settled disposition to be active (as the child who might acquire the knowledge that is 
requisite for wisdom); this is a potentiality,. Aristotle employs this distinction in his initial account of 
aisthesis. He claims that we are born with a actuality, to perceive (417b16-18) and that active 
perception is the related actuality2.(417b18-418a1) Further, he proposes that the transition from 
actuality, to actuality2,
is either not an alteration...or else is an alteration of a different sort [from that found in the
transition from potentiality, to actuality,]. (417b6-7;cf.418a1-6)
On the basis of this claim it is argued that Aristotle does not think that material alteration is required 
for the transition to active perception; for if he did, we would expect him to describe perception as 
involving a transition like the one from potentiality, to actuality,, since it is transitions of this sort which 
he calls alterations, alterations without qualification.10 So, the argument is that since Aristotle is not 
at all comfortable with calling the transition to active perception an alteration, he cannot think that it 
involves material change.
However, it seems to me that Aristotle is not concerned with the issue of material alteration 
in DA 11.5. Rather he is concerned with marking a distinction between energeia and its contrary. 
Aristotle addresses the same issue in Physics VI1.3 , where he argues that no transition to a perfection 
should be called an alteration (al/oiosis). When a builder tiles the roof of a house, he is not altering the 
house, rather he is perfecting it. So, the tiling is not an alteration. (246a17-19) When we become 
physically fit this is not due to an alteration; for being fit is a perfection in our nature. Active perception 
is a perfection as well; in perceiving we perfect our nature qua perceivers. This is why Aristotle claims 
that active perception is an energeia·, it is not a motion toward an end outside of itself; it is an end in 
itself. So, when viewed in light of the treatment in Physics VI1.3 , the rationale for claiming that the 
transition to active perception is not an a/ioiosis is that it is a transition is to a perfection and no such 
transition is an a/ioiosis. But on this rationale the possibility that certain transitions to a perfection 
involve material alteration is not ruled out. On the contrary, Aristotle explicitly shows that material 
alteration is sometimes involved; for in discussing physical fitness, he states that it "consists in a 
blending of hot and cold elements in due proportion...". (246b4-5) This blending certainly requires 
material alteration. So, the basis for supposing DA 11.5 shows that material alteration cannot be 
required in perception is thrown into doubt.
The example of the builder, which is used in Physics V II.3, is also used in DA 11.5. Within the 
context of discussing the transition to active perception, Aristotle states, "it is not right to say...that
4the builder undergoes alteration when he builds.". (417b5-7, Hicks) In saying this, he cannot mean that
the act of building, the act (for instance) of tiling a roof, does not require material alteration; for
obviously the builder must maneuver his body in order to do the tiling. Rather, what he means to show
is that building is analogous to perceiving: it is not the sort of activity through which the agent suffers
a loss of what is essential to being an agent of the given sort. The builder does not lose his special
technical knowledge through its exercise and we do not lose our perceptual hexis through perceiving.
This shows that in claiming the transition to active perception is not an alloiosis Aristotle does not
reveal a concern over the issue of whether a material alteration is involved. Rather, he reveals a
concern with marking a distinction between energeia and its contrary.11
This critique does not show that perception on Aristotle's account involves material alteration.
It shows that the treatment of alloiosis in DA 11.5 does not speak to the issue. Indirectly, however, this
suggests that material alteration is a requirement. Aristotle's predecessors took perception either to
involve or to be constituted by material alterations and if he himself makes no explicit claim to the
contrary, it is fair to presume that he thinks there is a role for material alteration in perception. This
sort of argument, however, does not resolve the issue. We need direct evidence concerning material
alteration in active perception. So, let us turn to the direct evidence.
In a number of places, both in the DA and elsewhere, Aristotle speaks of the efficacy of a
special class of perceptibles: intense perceptibles.12 These perceptibles have special powers which
are made manifest in two ways: First, they may temporarily impede our ability to become perceptually
aware. Second, they may bring about the destruction of the organ of perception. Aristotle states.
The sense loses its power to perceive, if the sensible object has been too intense: thus it 
cannot hear sound after very loud noises, and after too powerful colours and odours it can 
neither see nor smell. (DA III.4 429a31-b3, Hicks)
Excess of any sensible object is fatal to the organ, and so consequently excess of the tangible 
object is fatal to touch. (DA 111.13 435b13-15, Hicks)
The destruction of the organ clearly requires a material alteration; one of the necessary material
conditions for perception must be removed, if the organ is to be destroyed. For example, if the eye-jelly
permanently looses its transparency, then the eye is destroyed. Change of this kind requires material
alteration. Further, since the cause of the destruction of the organ is the same in kind as the cause of
temporary impediment to the organ,13 it is most plausible that the temporary impediment of the organ
also requires material alteration.
On the one hand, if you take the view that material alteration is required for perception, this
makes sense. The more intense the perceptible the more extreme is the material alteration which it
causes and if the alteration is extreme enough it either impedes the organs ability or it flat-out destroys
the organ. On the other hand, if one desires to maintain the thesis that material alteration is not
involved in active perception, then there are only two routes of explanation available: First, it may be
argued that, in all cases where (consequent upon the presentation of an intense perceptible) the organ
is either impeded or destroyed, it is a concurrent cause that brings about a material alteration within
the organ and it is not the perceptible itself, just as Aristotle says it is not the noise of the thunderbolt
itself, but the force of the accompanying air, that rives the timber.(DA 11.12 424b11-12) Second, it
may be argued that, while intense perceptibles do in themselves impede or destroy organs, we are not
justified in generalizing from such abnormal cases to normal cases of perception. So, while the action
Λ
of intense perceptibles brings about some sort of material alteration within the organ, this does not 
show that the action of normal perceptibles brings about a material alteration as well.
The first attempt does not succeed.14 In DA 111.13, after claiming that intense tangibles 
destroy not only the organ of touch, but the animal as well (because having the capacity for touch is 
necessary for animal life), Aristotle states,
The other sensibles - I mean color, sound, odour - do not by their excess destroy the animal, 
but only the corresponding sense-organ: except incidentally, as when concurrently with the 
sound some thrust or blow is given, or when objects of sight or smell move something else 
which destroys by contact. (435b7-12, Hicks)
In this passage Aristotle clearly refers to cases in which intense perceptibles destroy the organ without 
there being a concurrent material cause. Thus, he must think that intense perceptibles themselves 
cause the destruction of the respective organs.15
The second attempt also fails; for the ascription of 'intensity' to perceptibles is relativized in 
Aristotle's account. Consider the following passage:
...people who have been looking at strong, brilliant colours, or who go out of the sunlight into 
the dark, cannot see: the movement (kinesis) which is already present in their eyes is so strong 
that it precludes the movement which comes from without. (De Generation AnimaUum (GA) 
V.1,780a10-13. Peck; cf. De Insomniïs 2, 459b9-12)
In this passages, Aristotle presents a case in which the intensity of colours seen in the daylight impedes 
the organ's ability to perceive less intense colors in the dark.16 In this case the colors seen in daylight 
are not taken to be intense per se, rather they are taken to be intense relative to the sort of colors that 
are usually seen in the dark. Yet, the colors are not considered to be intense relative to other colours 
normally seen in the daylight; in respect to the latter the former are of normal intensity. Thus, it is due 
to the effects of normal perception in the daylight that, when we turn to darkness, our power of vision 
is diminished. The distinction between intense and normal perceptibles is sometimes a relative 
distinction. But notice that the second defense offered for the thesis that no material alteration is 
required in perception, demands an objective distinction between intense and normal perceptibles; it 
does not leave room for an account in which a given perceptible in one context causes a material 
alteration in the organ, while in another context the same perceptible causes no such alteration. Take 
the example of two people looking at a bright red barn in the daylight. One of them goes inside and 
because of the relative darkness cannot see. The other stays outside and continues to look at the barn. 
The thesis in question requires that while the person inside the barn had suffered material alteration in 
his eyes while outside the barn, the person remaining outside neither had suffered nor does suffer such 
alteration. This is most peculiar.17 Its peculiarity shows that Aristotle is in no position to accept the 
thesis in question. His own treatment of the efficacy of intense perceptibles makes sense only if he 
believes that active perception requires material alteration. Thus, it would seem that when Aristotle 
compares the destruction of the organ by intense perceptibles to the loss of harmony and pitch in a lyre 
by too violent plucking, (DA 11.12 424a28-32) he intends this to be a strong analogy; The plucking 
(whether mild or violent) causes material alteration in the lyre and perceptibles (whether normal or 
intense) cause material alteration in the organ.
We have answered our second question concerning perception: episodes of perception 
necessarily involve bodily change: they involve material alteration. Let us now turn to the question of 
whether episodes of thought require material alteration.
6§4. Aristotle says that thought (nous) is not without imagination (phantasia)', imagination is 
necessary for thought.18 This is true in two ways: The first has to do with concept acquisition. It 
surfaces through an analysis of Aristotle's reasons for thinking that perception is necessary for 
thought.19 Aristotle supposes that we come into existence with a full potentiality to actualize only 
one cognitive faculty: aisthesis. Prior to a period of maturation, we have only a potentiality! for 
thinking; we are members of a species such that by nature we may regularly come to have a full 
capacity (a potentiality2) for thought. Early on we are unable to reason, because we have not yet 
become acquainted with objects of thought; we have not yet acquired precise concepts (noematon). 
Perception serves nous in the process of concept acquisition and phantasia plays a role in this service. 
Thus, phantasia is a necessary antecedent causal condition for human thought; without it we could not 
come to actually think.
Let me make this connection between thought and imagination more clear. In Posterior 
Analytics (APo) 11.19, Aristotle sketches an account of concept acquisition. Briefly, he states that in 
some creatures perceptions persist within the soul. (99b39-1 OOal ) These stored perceptions are called 
memories. (100a3-4) In rational creatures experience (empeiria) comes out of memory (a4-5)20 and 
the principles of science and art come out of experience.(a6-9) In the latter two stages we have 
concepts: in virtue of experience, we possess concepts based on particulars and in virtue of art and 
science, we possess concepts involving the grasp of strict universals.21 While Aristotle does not 
explicitly mention imagination in APo 11.19, it is imagination which does the work of forming memories 
out of perceptions. Perceptions must somehow persist in order for memories to be formed and in the 
psychological works Aristotle makes it clear both that this persistence is to be attributed to imagination 
and that imagination brings about the formation of memories.22 Thus, phantasia plays the role of a 
necessary causal antecedent for human thought, since it is necessary in the process of concept 
formation.
The second (and for my purposes more important) way in which imagination is necessary for 
thought is that each episode of thought requires the use of an image (phantasma). In DA III.7, Aristotle 
claims that the soul never thinks without images (phantasmata) and that we think the forms in images. 
(431 al 6-17;b2) He goes on to enumerate the various types of thought. (b3-16) This enumeration of 
types of thought falls within the scope of the preceding claim: we think the forms in images. Thus, 
Aristotle thinks that images are used in each episode of thought. They are used for thought in all 
practical contexts: they are used when the good or the bad of the object is 'right on the surface', 
(431 al 4-17) when the good or the bad of the object needs to be reasoned to, (431b2-6) and in 
deliberation about hypothetical practical situations.(b6-10) In addition, images are used for thought in 
all non-practical contexts: they are used in propositional thought, (b10-12) in thought about 
mathematical objects, (b12-16)23 and in non-propositional thought: thought about essence.24 The 
thesis that episodes of thought require the use of images is placed beyond doubt by the following claim 
from DA III.8:
Whenever one in actuality thinks, it is necessary at that very time to think with an image (hotan
te theorei, ananke hama phantasmati theorein). (432a8-9)25 
Understanding this connection between imagination and thought is crucial to determining whether 
material alteration is required in episodes of thought; for I will show that images are material items 
within the body and that their use in thought involves material alteration. Let me start by addressing
7what it means to possess images.
Aristotle's treatise on memory, the De Memoria (Mem.), provides us with useful information 
about the nature of images (phantasmata). In the first chapter, Aristotle not only reiterates the claim 
that thought is not without images, (449b32-450a1 ) he makes the specific claim that there is no 
remembering without images. (450a13-14) Both thought (taken generally) and acts of remembering 
use images. In order to remember, one must both become aware of an image, use it as the copy of 
that of which it is an image, (451 al 4-15 with 450b17) and become aware of the time at which the 
image came to be formed. (449b28-30) In contrast, the general requirements placed upon an episode 
of thought are less restricted. Images must be used, but they needn't be used as a copy of something 
else: (450b20-26) I can think about the Pythagorean Theorem without considering the image as a copy 
of the Pythagorean Theorem. Further, one need not become aware of some earlier time at which the 
employed image came to be formed: (451 a8-12) I needn't consider the time and date at which I learned 
the Pythagorean Theorem in order to think about it now. What remains common to both thought (taken 
generally) and acts of remembering is the use (or activation) of images.
The discussion of the requirements for acts of remembering makes it clear that on Aristotle's 
views there is a material basis for the possession of images; he thinks that the images are bodily marks 
(tupoi) 'carved' in the matter of the proton aisthetikon: the primary organ of perception.26 The 
principal evidence for this is found in Aristotle's application of the wax block model to memory. 
(450a26-b11 ) Aristotle, along with Plato before him27, thinks that an image stored in the memory can 
be likened to a mark in a wax block that comes about owing to the impress of a signet ring.(450a31- 
bl ) Plato probably takes the analogy to be rather weak. The memory trace is not said to be a mark 
in something material. Rather, it would seem that the trace is predicated of mind and, since mind is 
non-bodily, the trace is non-bodily as well. (Theaetetus 191 c-d) While memory may be non-bodily for 
Plato,28 he exploits the wax block analogy both in likening differences in memory capacity to 
differences of size among wax blocks and in likening differences in the ability to take on memories to 
differences in the softness and the hardness of the blocks. ( Theaetetus 194c-d) Aristotle follows his 
teacher in likening differences in the ability to take on a memory to differences of softness and 
hardness. But he treats the analogy as being stronger than Plato seems to do. First, he does not 
divorce memory from the body; he attributes memory to the proton aisthetikon·. a bodily organ. 
(451a15-18) More importantly, he asserts that, in order to study memory one must take into 
consideration the happenings that occur in the part of the body containing the perceptive soul.(450a27- 
29) Thus, one component of the investigation into memory is an investigation into something bodily. 
Second, he identifies types of persons who have poor memories and he explains their lack in terms of 
material conditions. He claims that the young and the old do not have good memories, since the former 
are growing and too moist (hugroteroi'AbObQ) while the latter are in decay and too dry 
(sk/eroteroi;450b10). In making this claim, he does not mean that the young are 'as-if' moist or that 
the old are 'as-if' dry. Rather, he is referring to what he takes to be real differences of bodily 
constitution among the young and the old. Elsewhere, in De Longitud ine Vitae, he supposes both that 
the young are literally more moist than those in their prime and that the old are literally more dry than 
those in their prime. (466a18-23, bl 3-1 5) In addition, he invokes these differences in the explanation 
of how the young and the old are limited in their ability to perceive.29 Thus, he thinks that changes
in the material constitution of the proton aisthetikon explain differences in the ability to retain memories;
such changes explain the destruction of existing images. So, he must think that images, like
impressions in a wax block, are real marks in matter: they are marks in the proton aisthetikon.
We have now seen that on Aristotle's account stored images are marks in matter. The question
is whether the use (or the activation) of these images is a material alteration. Prima facie, it is not
absurd to suppose that it is not a material alteration. In the case of perception, the object of perception
suffers no material happening: nothing material happens to the tree when I come to be perceptually
aware of it. Further, neither in desiring nor in thinking does the respective object suffer a change.30
Thus, one might suppose that the activation of images in episodes of thought does not involve a
material process. This line of thought finds its basis of support in the supposition that images play a
role analogous to that which the perceptible object plays in perceiving. This, however, this is not the
case. The trace in the matter, the image itself, is not an object of thought when it functions within the
occurrence of that thought.31 Rather, the event of coming to be aware of an object of thought
depends on the activation of the material trace. Aristotle claims that we think with images; (DA 111.8
432a8-9) we think the forms in images. (III.7 431 b2) He does not suppose that we think images per
se. Images serve as counters or symbols for what we think; they are not typically the objects of
thought. (III.8 432a11 -14) So their role in thought is typically not that of the direct objects of cognitive
awareness. For this reason the supposition, based on the argument above, that the use of images does
not require a material alteration loses its prima facie plausibility.
The use of images in thought certainly does, on Aristotle's account, require material alteration.
The evidence comes from the discussion of recollection in Mem. 2. Aristotle states.
The following is a sign that the affection [i.e. recollection] is something to do with the body, 
and that recollection is a search in something bodily for an image. It upsets people when they 
are unable to recollect in spite of applying their thought hard...he who is recollecting and 
hunting moves a bodily thing in which the affection resides (somatikon ti kinei, en ho to 
pathos). The people who get upset most are those who happen to have fluid around the 
perceptive region [of the body]. For once moved \kinetheisa), the fluid is not easily stopped 
until what is sought returns and the movement (kinesis) takes a straight course. And this is 
also why, when cases of anger and of fear set something moving (ti kinesosin), they are not 
halted, even though the people set up counter-movements in turn... (453a 14-28, Sorabji 1972)
This passage shows that recollection requires a material process.32 This is first suggested by the
claim that the motion of recollection is greater in those with more fluid about the part of the body
having to do with perception. The motion appears to have a material component. Second, this is
suggested by the claim that the mind can lose control of the process of hunting up the images. Third,
the comparison between the motion necessary for recollection and the motion necessary for emotion
makes certain that Aristotle thinks material alteration is involved. He claims that the motion of
recollection disturbs the person in the same manner in which the motions of anger and fear do. We
know from the account of anger in DA 1.1 that the motions of anger and fear upset the person, because
they involve material alterations. Aristotle states, "anger is desire for retaliation or the like...[and]...a
boiling of blood or heat which is about the heart." (403a30-b1 ) For there to be anger in us there must
be suitable material (blood), suitable motion (boiling) and suitable form (desire for retaliation). The
motion of anger involves a material alteration and, since this motion is like that of recollection, the latter
also involves a material alteration. The alteration in recollection terminates in the activation of images.
9This means that part of the explanation of how images are activated is that they suffer a process of 
material alteration. Thus, since the activation of images is necessary for episodes of thought, it follows 
that episodes of thought must be accompanied by specific material alterations within the body.
§5. We have answered our second question concerning thought; on Aristotle's account, episodes 
of human thought necessarily involve bodily change: they involve material alteration. On the one hand, 
this is in itself an interesting find. On the other hand, the question of why Aristotle thinks that this is 
so is all the more interesting. In closing, I would like to offer a suggestion concerning his rationale for 
supposing that there is a necessary connection between episodes of thought and episodes of 
imagination. In addition, I would like to discuss the implications of this connection for our 
understanding of how our nous is less bodily than aisthesis.
The claim that there is a necessary connection between thought and imagination does not 
follow directly from Aristotle's conception of the essential nature of thought; the example of the Prime 
Mover shows us this. On Aristotle's account the essential nature of thought does not imply necessary 
bodily conditions for being a thinking think and a fortiori it does not imply such conditions for episodes 
of thought. The claim that there is a necessary connection between thought and imagination is an 
empirical claim; it is a supposition based on what is taken to be most reasonable in light of all the 
'appearances'. The empirical nature of the claim has prompted some scholars to suppose that Aristotle 
would be open to the possibility that certain people think without using their imagination.33 It is 
suggested that in principle there is no obstacle to our having pure abstract thoughts: thoughts that are 
entirely free of symbolization. I think that this view is mistaken. Aristotle's insistence on such a 
connection between phantasia and nous is motivated by a desire to explain our intellectual failures. 
He (along with Plato before him34) is concerned with explaining how it comes to be that we sometimes 
forget what we have learned. Forgetting is an intellectual failure. But since Aristotle considers nous 
in itself to be (somehow) divine and impassive, he is not inclined to attribute this failure to nous per se. 
Thus, he attributes it to a capacity that is tied more closely to the changeable body. This is born out 
in a passage from DA 1.4:
...thought and the exercise of knowledge are enfeebled through the loss of something else 
within, but are in themselves impassive...Hence when this possessor [of thought] perishes, 
there is neither memory nor love: for these never did belong to the thinking faculty, but to the 
composite whole which has perished, while the intellect is doubtless a thing more divine and 
is impassive. (408b24-29, Hicks)
This passage suggests that the intellectual failure is a failure of imagination; it is a failure of the body, 
not one of nous per se, but a failure of what is required for nous in human beings. Thus, if Aristotle 
were to sanction the possibility of thought without the use of images, he would no longer be in a 
position to explain how we sometimes lose the knowledge that is expressed in those thoughts: if the 
connection between phantasia and nous were founded merely on the notion that phantasia serves as 
a necessary causal antecedent for thought, then he would lose his explanation of how wë come to 
forget. Thus, while the connection between phantasia and nous is empirically grounded, Aristotle does 
not seem prepared to allow exceptions to its rule.
Further, Aristotle may be concerned with questions about recollection: recollection of the sort 
discussed in Plato's middle period. Aristotle (like Plato and Anaxagorus before him35) thinks that our
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nous is somehow divine. Since he is willing to consider the possibility that divinity entails eternality 
for nous (or at least some part of it),36 he may be cognizant of the additional problem of explaining 
our inability to recollect knowledge gained prior to this life. The passage (above) provides him with a 
straightforward explanation of our inability to recollect. We cannot recollect knowledge gained prior 
to this life, because all knowledge depends on the use of memory traces and the memory traces formed 
prior to this life have been destroyed along with the bodies in which they were housed.37 Thus it is 
only through the supposition of a necessary connection between episodes of thought and episodes of 
imagination that Aristotle is able to both maintain the divinity of nous and save the 'appearances'. This 
means that his insistence that images play a role in thinking is not to be explained entirely in terms of 
his so-called 'empiricism' and 'naturalism': he postulates the use of images in all human thinking, 
because he is aware of the fragility of all human thinking - whatever the object, the thinking depends 
on recall which depends on the body. He reconciles this fragility with the endoxon (a philosopher's 
belief) that nous is (somehow) divine.38
Finally, let us return to Aristotle's claim that nous is less bodily than aisthesis. (DA III.4 429b5- 
6) We have seen that if Aristotle thinks that perception does not involve material alteration, the claim 
that nous is less bodily than aisthesis may be taken to imply that nous has neither necessary nor 
sufficient material conditions. The claim may be taken to imply a Platonist position: a position in which 
nous is taken to be non-bodily. However, we have also seen that, for Aristotle, if a suitable material 
alteration takes place within an organ of perception, then one becomes perceptually aware in some 
way.39 So, once the right sort of external cause is provided, material alteration within the organ is 
sufficient for episodes of perception. Thus, the claim that nous is less bodily than aisthesis should not 
be taken to imply that Aristotle holds a Platonist position.
However, one might ask whether on my view Aristotle is forced into taking the position that 
nous is no less bodily than aisthesis; for I have argued that episodes of human thought require both a 
suitable organ and suitable material alteration within that organ. One might take this to suggest that 
noetic awareness, like perceptual awareness, has both necessary and sufficient physiological 
conditions. However, this is not correct. While for Aristotle thought demands material processes, 
material processes are not sufficient for thought. The processes that are required for thought take 
place in the primary organ of perception. They are perceptual processes per se and noetic only 
incidentally. {Mem. 1, 450a22-25) Thus, they may occur without the occurrence of an episode of 
thought. There is an important difference between the role of material alteration in perception and its 
role in human thought: if a scientist examines my eyes when I am looking at a red object, she can 
determine from the material state of my eyes alone that I am perceptually aware of red.40 But, if she 
examines my primary organ of perception and discovers the occurrence of a material process, she is 
not in a position to determine that I am thinking. The material processes in question cannot be 
distinguished from those involved in remembering. Remembering is an activity which is shared by most 
animals: it is a perceptual activity and so the activation of stored phantasmata does not imply thought; 
it implies perceptual awareness and it allows for the possibility of noetic awareness.
In addition, if the scientist discovers the occurrence of a material process in my primary organ 
of perception when I am thinking, she is not in a position to determine what I am thinking. Consider 
a passage from Mem. 1 :
It is not possible to think without an image. For the same effect occurs in thinking as in 
drawing a diagram. For in the latter case, though we do not make use of the fact that the 
triangle is determinate, we none the less draw it with a determinate size. And similarly 
someone who is thinking, even if he is not thinking of something with a size, places something 
with a size before his eyes, but thinks of it not as having a size. If its nature is that of things 
which have a size, but not a determinate one, he places before his eyes something with a 
determinate size, but thinks of it simply as having size. (449b32-450a6, Sorabji 1972; cf. 
Physics 11.2 1 93b23-1 94a12).
It is clear from this passage that for Aristotle the same token image can be used in thought about (1 )
an object with a determinate size, (2) an object with size, but not a determinate one, and (3) an object
that lacks size. Each image has a determinate size, but we need not consider its size in thought. Once
it is clear that we can in thought ignore the determinate size of an image, I see no reason to suppose
that we cannot ignore other of its determinate features. Consider how Aristotle might explain the
representational basis for thought about 'figure': activate a phantasma that exemplifies where
these are the characteristics of 'triangle' (a plane figure bound by three straight lines) and ignore fn (its
having this determinate number of lines). The same token phantasma used in thought about 'triangle'
can be used in thought about 'figure' (and, for that matter, also in thought about 'extension' and
'limit').41 Thus, while we must use images in thought, specific images do not determine precise noetic
content. At most they constrain the range of possible thoughts.42
We have seen that, for Aristotle, episodes of human thinking demand a suitable organ and a
suitable material alteration within that organ. However, this does not imply that nous is no less bodily
than a/sthesis. Since specific images do not determine specific thoughts, nous turns out to be less
bodily: while both perceptual awareness and noetic awareness have necessary material conditions, the
former has sufficient ones and the latter does not.43
1. Aristotle would call any natural change, any change according to the phusis of a thing, physiological 
(phusis-iogos). Changes of this sort would include, not only perceiving and thinking, but more mundane 
happenings as well (such as that of a rock falling over a precipice). Roughly, under what we now call 
physiological change Aristotle would include growth, diminution and material alteration, (see De Motu 
Animalium 5)
2. For representative accounts see Hicks, Aristotle: De Anima. Cambridge, 1907, p.xlviii-lii; Beare, 
Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition. Oxford, 1906, p.234-235; and Hamlyn, Aristotle's De Anima. 
Oxford, 1 968, p. 104-1 5.
3. Burnyeat (1992) "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? A Draft", in M. Nussbaum and 
A. Rorty (eds.) Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, Oxford, 1992, p.1 5-26; Burnyeat (1993), "Aristote voit 
du rouge et entend; combien se passe-t-il de choses? Remarques sur le De Anima, II, 7-8", in Revue 
Philosophique, 1993, no.2, p.263-280. For the latter, all quotations will be taken from the pre­
publication English version.
4. Arguments against Burnyeat's position have been advanced in Nussbaum & Putnam, "Changing 
Aristotle's Mind", in Nussbaum and Rorty {ibid.), p.27-56; S. Marc Cohen, "Hylomorphism and 
Functionalism", in Nussbaum and Rorty {ibid.), p.57-74; Gareth B. Matthews, "De Anima 2.2-4 and the
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Meaning of Life", in Nussbaum and Rorty (ibid.), p. 185-194; Richard Sorabji (1992), "Intentionality and 
Psychological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense-Perception", in Nussbaum and Rorty (ibid.), p.195- 
226; Cynthia Freeland "Aristotle on the Sense of Touch", in Nussbaum and Rorty (ibid.), p.227-248;
S. Granger, "Aristotle and Perceptual Realism", in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, XXXI, suppl., 
p.161-172; Jonathan Lear, Aristotle and The Desire To Understand. Cambridge, 1988, chpt.4. Support 
for Burnyeat's position is offered in S. Broadie, "Aristotle's Perceptual Realism", in The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy, XXXI, suppl., p.137-160.
5. (1) Richard Sorabji (1972), Aristotle on Memory. Brown U. Press, 1972, p.14-17; (2) K. V. Wilkes, 
Phvsicalism. Humanities Press Inc., 1978, p.115-116; (3) M. Nussbaum (1978). Aristotle's De Motu 
Animalium. Princeton, 1978, p.265-269.
6. Perception does not merely serve the ends of nutrification and reproduction. It also serves as a 
necessary basis for acquiring theoretical knowledge for beings that must acquire such knowledge by 
learning. (DA III.8 432a7-8) Beings of this sort are bodily creatures.
7. He asserts that nous (or a nous) is separable at DA III.4 429b4-5, III.5 430a17-18 and 430a22-23. 
He also gestures toward the separability of nous within hypothetical contexts; see DA 1.1 403a10-11, 
1.5 411 bl 5-19 and 11.1 413a12-15.
8. Consider the following passage from DA 11.1: "But as regards intellect (nous) and the speculative 
faculty the case is not yet clear. It would seem, however, to be a distinct species of soul, and it alone 
is capable of separation from the body, as that which is eternal from that which is perishable.”. 
(413b24-27, Hicks; cf. 413a3-7)
9. See DA 1.1 403a8-10 with III.7 431 al 6-17; III.8 432a8-9 and Mem. 1, 449b32-450a1.
10. See Burnyeat (1992), p.19.
11. In DA 11.5 Aristotle is also concerned with navigating among the abstract notions of settled state 
(hexis) and affection (pathos). In Categories (Cat.) 14 he says that alteration is change in quality 
(metabole kata to poion; 1 5b 12-13). He does not consider whether there are types of al/oiosis in this 
chapter, but in an earlier chapter (Cat. 8), he claims that there are four types of qualities. There are 
(1) settled states (8b25ff), (2) dispositions (9a16), (3) passive qualities or affections (9a28-29), and 
(4) shapes (1 Oal 1 -12). Two of these types, settled states (hexeis) and affections (pathai), are 
especiailv relevant to the discussion of potentiality and actuality in DA 11.5. A hexis is i  aua:iry ;hat 
is ¡ong lasting and stable. One of the examples of hexis cited in Cat. 8 (as well as in DA il.5) is 
knowledge.(8b29) Once we come to have knowledge it is hard to lose. An important difference 
between a hexis and a pathos is that the latter is neither long lasting nor stable; it is the sort of quality 
that comes and goes. Aristotle gives the example of someone blushing due to shame. We say that 
such a person has been affected.(9b33) We do not say that he has acquired a hexis; for this is a 
temporary occurrence. By comparison the man whose face is always red is said to have a ruddy 
complexion; he is said to have a hexis. (9b31 -32) As we read on in the chapter, we find that Aristotle 
says that among the types of qualities hexeis are in fact qualities, but twice he says that pathe are not 
qualities. (9b33, 10al 0) Here Aristotle singles out hexeis as the most perfect qualities. These settled 
states are long lasting and stable, while affections are not. Thus, pathe are classified as qualities, but 
they are not (if you will) commended as qualities; they are not the most perfect sorts of qualities.
We may infer from this discussion that pathe either are not qualities or they differ in kind from 
the qualities that are hexeis and, since each sort of quality is brought about by a corresponding sort 
of al/oiosis, it follows that the al/oiosis which brings about a pathos is either not an al/oiosis or is a
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different kind of al/oiosis from that which brings about a hexis. But notice, this is precisely what 
Aristotle says about the transition to active perception in DA 11.5; it is either not an alloiosis or it is 
alloiosis of a different sort. (417b6-7) This suggests that Aristotle's reluctance to say that the transition 
is an alloiosis is due to the fact that it does not bring about a hexis; it does not bring about a settled 
state of perception. So (again) we see that Aristotle's claim regarding the transition to active 
perception need not be taken to speak directly to the question of whether material alteration is involved. 
Rather, it seems to speak to an abstract distinction between settled states and affections, a distinction 
that can be maintained regardless of whether particular states or affections come to be as the result 
of material alteration.
12. See DA 11.9.421 bl 9-26; Il.10.422a29-31 ; 11.12.424a28-32; Ill.2.426a27-b7; Ill.4.429a31-b3;
III. 13.435b6-16; De Somniis 1, 454a23-b10; 2, 459b1-24; GA V .1.779b13-780a16.
13. See, especially, De Insomniis 2, 459b1-24.
14. Others have claimed that Aristotle's treatment of intense perceptibles requires that all perception 
involves material alteration, (see Lear, p.114-115) My contribution is to show that no attempt to deny 
this can be successful.
1 5. This is further supported by the account of impediment to vision in GA V.1. There, Aristotle states 
that the motion qua transparent (kinesis he diaphanes) within the eye brings about vision.(780a 1 -3) 
This motion is caused by color. Since he states that it is an excess of this motion which impedes the 
eye's ability to see,(780a7-1 5) it is the excess of the motion that is caused by color which impedes our 
ability to see; the impediment is not due to a concurrent cause.
16. He is not concerned with cases in which we turn to complete darkness; for if he were, what we 
may have seen before we turned to the dark would be of no consequence. Vision is impossible in 
complete darkness, (see DA 11.7 418b2-3)
17. The converse also produces the same peculiarity. One person is outside looking at the barn. The 
other, who has just come out of the barn, joins him. The second person is dazzled by the brightness 
and so, when they are standing side by side outside and looking at the very same barn, the first person 
is not undergoing material alteration while the second, being dazzled, is.
18. See note 9.
19. See DA III.8 432a7-8 and APo 1.18 81a38-40.
20. There is a controversy over whether on Aristotle's account certain non-rational animals also develop 
experience. In Metaphysics A. 1, he states that animals other than man "have but little of experience 
(empeirias de metexeimikron).”($Q0b26-21) Some, following Alexander Aphrodisiensis, take this to 
be a deliberate understatement, meaning that no animals have experience. (See W.W. Fortenbaugh, 
Aristotle on Emotion. Harper & Row, 1975, p.47 n.2) Others take this to indicate that animals with 
good memories can develop experience. (See W.D.Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics v .1 . Oxford, 1924. 
p. 116-1 77)
21. See Metaphysics A.1 981a5-7.
22. See De Insomniis 3, 460b28-29 & Mem. 1, 450a31 -32.
23. See Mem. 1, 450a1-6.
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24. See III.8 432a11-14. I take the "primary notions (ta...prota noemata)" {aM)  to be notions of 
essence.
25. cf. DA III.7 431 b2 & Mem. 1, 449b32-450a1.
26. This view is defended in both R. Sorabji (1972) p.14-17 and M. Wedin Mind and Imagination in 
Aristotle. Yale University Press, 1988, p.116-141.
27. See Theaetetus 191a-195b.
28. The wax block analogy is rejected by the end of the Theaetetus and so this might not be Plato's 
ultimate position on the issue.
29. The young suffer night-blindness, because of an over abundance of moisture, while the old suffer 
cataracts, because of dryness.(See GA V.1 780a 14-21)
30. See Metaphysics A .7 1072a26-28.
31. It would seem that there is at least one important exception to this general claim. When we judge, 
while asleep, that a dream is not true, this is an act of thought. Since the dream itself is the object of 
the judgment, it would seem that the phantasmata are the objects of the judgment, (see De insomniis 
1, 458b18-26)
32. Once again Aristotle differs with Plato. In the Phi/ehus Plato says that recollection is internal to 
psuche and is done without the body.(34B-C)
33. See Nussbaum (1978), p.266-267.
34. See Phi/ebus 33c-34b.
35. See Phaedo 78b-81a, Anaxagoras fragment 12.
36. See DA 11.2 413b24-27 & III.5 430a22-23; EN X.7 1177a13-17 & b28-31.
37. I do not think that Aristotle is directly concerned with the problem of recollection in the DA 1.4 
passage (408b24-29). Rather, the account there can be used as a basis for a solution to the problem. 
In DA III.5, Aristotle states "when separated it [i.e. productive intellect] is simply just what it is, and 
this alone is deathless and eternal (but there is no remembering, because this is unaffected while the 
passive intellect is perishable)..." (430a22-24). I think he is directly concerned with the problem of 
recollection in this passage. Further, since passive intellect is (somehow) dependent upon phantasia, 
this passage provides us, in outline, with the aforementioned explanation of why we are unable to 
recollect knowledge gained prior to this life.
38. Aristotle also seeks an explanation for why we are not always thinking.(see DA III.4 430a4-6) This 
question is important to him, because 'productive intellect' is like the Prime Mover (if not identical to 
it) and the Prime Mover is always thinking. The use of images in human thought may provide Aristotle 
with a suitable explanation. However, further study of the connection between Metaphysics A and DA
III.4-5 is needed before such an assertion can be offered with confidence.
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39. Here I construe 'perceptual awareness' rather broadly. It includes unqualified perception 
(perception of external objects or qualities) and qualified perception (remembering, dreaming and even 
hallucinating). Material alteration in the organ is not alone sufficient for episodes of unqualified 
perception. For that we also need the right sort of external efficient cause.
40. If she also ascertains that I am suitably related to a red external object, she can determine that my 
awareness of red is specifically of the unqualified sort (see the previous note).
41. Michael Wedin has recently argued that for Aristotle thought supervenes on images. (See his 
"Content and Cause in Aristotle's Mind", in The Southern Journal o f Philosophy, XXXI, 1993, suppl., 
p.49-105.) He suggests that Aristotle's phantasmata are formal exemplars, satisfying the following 
constraint (where /  stands for 'image' and F for form or object of thought):
i  canonically exemplifies F [iff] /  exemplifies fy...fn & are those features that are
characteristic of Fs (or of instances of F) & / exemplifies only (Wedin 1993, p.78).
The constraint is meant to insure that phantasmata exemplify only those features that are characteristic 
of their respective objects of thought. It requires that a given phantasma can be used only in thought 
about a single noeton (but a given noeton can have a number of representational bases). My argument, 
based on Mem. 1 , 449b32-450a6 (above), suggests that this constraint is one that Aristotle could not 
sanction. For a different (though I think equally persuasive) attack on Wedin's thesis, see Victor Caston 
"Aristotle and Supervenience", in The Southern Journal o f Philosophy, XXXI, 1993, suppl., p. 107-133, 
esp. p .123-124.
42. This view is defended by Howard Robinson in his "Form and the Immortality of the Intellect from 
Aristotle to Aquinas", in Blumenthal and Robinson (eds.) Aristotle and the Later Tradition. Oxford, 
1991, p .207-226. Specifically, Robinson contends that the phantasma of a red circle could be used 
as a basis for thought of 'red' and as a basis for thought of 'round'. (Robinson, p .211) I think that 
Robinson's account is defensible. If we take Aristotle's thesis of representation seriously (even if we 
cannot now believe it), we see that no phantasma that exemplifies some shape can fail to also 
exemplify some primary sensible quality, like color. In D£, III. 1, Aristotle considers the question of why 
we have more than one sense modality. The answer is that having a plurality of such modalities helps 
us to better perceive the common sensibles: magnitude, motion, etc. (425b3-5). In support of this 
answer, he argues,
For, if sight had been our only sense and whiteness its object, we should have been more apt 
to overlook the common sensibles and to confuse all sensibles, because color and magnitude, 
for instance, always go together (425b6-9, Hicks).
Here Aristotle contends that the perception of common sensibles, like shape, must involve the 
perception of proper sensibles, like color. Now since phantasmata are stored aisthemata and since the 
stimulation of the proton aisthetikon by phantasmata occurs in the same way as its stimulation in 
unqualified perception (see De insomni/s 2, 460b23-26), it would seem that phantasmata cannot be 
exemplars of shape, or any common sensible, without also being exemplars of some primary sensible 
quality, like color. So, it would seem that a phantasma used in thought of 'round', where 'round' has 
characteristics f ,.. .fn, must exemplify not only ^ .../η, but also some characteristic fn+u a primary 
sensible quality. And if one can ignore 7n+1 in order to think of 'round', then presumably one can also 
ignore f, . . . fn in order to think of that primary sensible quality, say, 'red'.
43. In this essay I have not addressed the question of whether there is a dualism between the 
'productive intellect' and the 'passive intellect' of DA III.5. This calls for a detailed study and space 
does not allow for it here. I would suggest, however, that 'productive intellect' is not itself enough for 
thought: it is only an agent in thought. Thus, even if it is non-bodily, it is not itself a non-bodily psychic 
capacity.
